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Calculating Compassion
KATHLEEN WOODWARD*
Compassion, like so many of our other complex emotions, has a heady
political life. Invoking compassion is an important means of trying to
direct social, political, and economic resources in one's direction (indeed,
compassion is one of those resources).'
During the second presidential debate of the 1992 election, the three
candidates-George Bush, Bill Clinton, and Ross Perot-were asked by a woman in
the studio audience in Richmond, Virginia how their own lives had been affected by
the national debt It was a moment that was to prove decisive. President George Bush,
perplexed and nonplused, literally did not understand the question. "I'mnot sure I get
it," he said. "Help me with the question and I'll try to answer."2 Clinton, opening his
arms, moved toward the audience and responded that he personally knew people in
Arkansas who were suffering because they had lost their jobs. The clear implication
was that he acutely felt their pain and Bush did not. What was at stake was the
presidential politics of empathy. The rest is history.
Two weeks later Bush, criticizing Clinton's plan to establish an office devoted to
AIDS in Washington, insisted, "We need more compassion in our hometowns, more
education, more caring."3 If in fact there had been a concerted effort on the part of the
Bush campaign to establish compassion as a strong theme in 1992, it failed. But as
we all know, eight years later the rhetoric of empathy uncannily returned, surfacing
in George W. Bush's campaign against Al Gore. What the elder George Bush
fumbled, the son repossessed. Under the well-calculated banner of compassionate
conservatism, the Republicans successfully appropriated the rhetoric of feeling that
had been so powerfully associated with the Democrats. Indeed, the presidential race
of 2000 at times seemed marked by a competition between Al Gore and George W.
Bush in terms of who could lay claim to being the most compassionate. Feeling
someone else's pain. Compassionate conservatism. These presidential campaign
* Kathleen Woodward is Professor of English at the University of Washington, where
she directs the Walter Chapin Simpson Center for the Humanities. The author ofAgingandIts
Discontents: Freud and Other Fictions and the editor of Figuring Age:
Women-Bodies--Generations and The Myths ofInformation: Technology andPostindustrial
Culture, she is completing a book entitled Statistical Panic and Other Essays on the Cultural
Politics of the Emotions.
1. ELIZABETHV. SPELMAN, FRurrs OF SORROW: FRAMING OURATrENTION TO SUFFERING
88-89 (1997).
2. Linda Diebel, No Miraclesfor Bush in TVDebate, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 16, 1992, at
Al; see also Nancy Mathis et al., Campaign '92/The Second DebateiClinton, Bush Camps
Both Claim Victory in Debate H, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 16, 1992, at 16.
3. On the Trail, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 31, 1992, at A6. While George Bush might
not have won the election on the platform of compassion, he was nonetheless known as a man
who was often moved to tears. Mary Chapman & Glenn Hendler, Introduction to SENTIMENTAL
MEN: MAscuLuNTy AND THE POuTICS OF AFFECT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (Mary Chapman
& Glenn Hendler eds., 1999).
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slogans are testimony to the pivotal power of a national discourse of empathy, one on
which the political fortunes of George Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush in
great part turned.4
How do we understand the uses of compassion in the body politic today?. How do
appeals to sentiment-specifically to compassion-work? What are 1he limits of
compassion? How do liberal and conservative narratives of compassion differ? In this
Article I thread my way through some of the debates about the political efficacy of
compassion, focusing on the work of scholars of sentiment-legal scholar Lynne
Henderson, philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Elizabeth Spelman, and Lauren
Berlant in literary and cultural studies. Taken together, the work of these scholars can
be said to present the liberal narrative of compassion, albeit variously embraced and
critiqued. I also consider some of the statements made about compassion by
Republicans, including George W. Bush as well as Marvin Olasky, the author of
Compassionate Conservatism, and Joseph Jacobs, the author of The Compassionate
Conservative.6 Ultimately I conclude that the politically astute appropriation of the
discourse of compassion by the George W. Bush presidential campaign in 2000 was
in part made possible by the convergence of two distinct-and usually
contradictory-trends in the way emotions are experienced and performed in
contemporary culture: on the one hand, we are witnessing a flattening of the
psychological emotions to intensities; on the other hand, we are witnessing the
emergence of the sensitive man, the development of the man of feeling.
I have argued elsewhere that we are living in a cultural moment in which a new
economy of the emotions is emerging.7 Once relatively stable, discourses of the
emotions are now circulating at a rapid rate. Even as the possibilities of an
individual's emotional repertoire are expanding (hence the emergence of the man of
feeling), our postmodem culture is increasingly characterized by what Fredric
Jameson has called the waning of affect.8 I agree with Jameson's analysis. In a culture
dominated by the media, much of our emotional experience, once understood in terms
ofa psychology of depth and interiority, has been reduced to intensities or sensations.
Sensations such as the thrills spiked by good action films. Or, as I explore in another
4. This is clearly seen in five cartoons published in The New Yorker between November
1995 and June 200 1. J.B. Handelsman, Ilike that-'compassionatepredators. ',NEWYORKER,
Nov. 1, 1999, at 99; David Sipress, Well, I guess this means we'll have to startfeeling our own
pain again., NEWYORKER, Jan. 22, 200 1, at 6; Barbara Smaller, Maybe the compassionatepart
will kick in during the second half of the Administration., NEW YORKER, June 4, 2001, at 46;
Mick Stevens, Let me through. I'm a compassionate conservative!, NEW YORKER, Aug. 9,
1999, at 28; Mick Stevens, We used to feel your pain, but that's no longer our policy., NEW
YORKER, Nov. 20, 1995, at 89.
5. MARTIN N. OLASKY, COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES,
AND How IT CAN TRANSFORM AMERICA (2000).
6. JOSEPH J. JACOBS, THE COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATIVE: ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY
AND RESPECTING HUMAN DIGNITY (2000).
7. Kathleen Woodward, Grief- Work in ContemporaryAmerican Cultural Criticism, 15.2
DISCOURSE 94 (1992-93); Kathleen Woodward, Anger ... and Anger: From Freud to
Feminism, in FREUD AND THE PASSIONS 73 (John O'Neill ed., 1996).
8. See generally Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism, 146 NEW LEFr REV. 53 (1984).
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essay, sensations such as the panic induced by the omnipresent discourse of statistical
risks to one's health.9 Or, given George W. Bush's rallying cry of compassionate
conservatism, sensations such as the short-term intensity of self-satisfied sympathy.
At the same time, if in the 1950s in the United States the emotions were distributed
in the white middle class according to gender in conventional or stereotypical ways,
this has radically changed. Generally speaking, we can say that in the 1950s the
expression of grief was proscribed in men, the expression of anger in women. But
today cultural scripts for the emotions are more flexible or mixed. The presidential
campaigns of 1992 and 2000 are perfect cases in point. If conventional wisdom tells
us that women are more empathetic than men, our cultural moment requires that our
male leaders be both strong and sensitive, thus allowing them to play both
conventional gender parts simultaneously. Or, more accurately, that they display or
perform sensitivity. Or, in a further compression of story to slogan in our media-
dominated culture, that they at least deploy the rhetoric of sensitivity. In the instance
of Bush's compassionate conservatism the two trends in the way the emotions are
experienced and performed in contemporary culture coalesce: the performance of
compassion by Bush as a presidential candidate is paradoxically an instance of the
flattening of feeling. The slogan "compassionate conservatism" trades on the rhetoric
of feeling even as it is curiously empty of it. In this sense "compassionate
conservatism" can be said to be an oxymoron.
It was widely remarked that President Bush's inaugural speech of January 20,
2001, was long on the rhetoric of compassion and short on the principles of
conservatism.' But in terms of action, the converse has been the definite case in the
Bush administration. " The public masculinization ofsentimentbyRepublicans serves
as a screen for the privatization of the state, for the divestiture of the federal
government of responsibility for many of our nation's citizens. The phrase
"compassionate conservatism" is also code for the federal turn to faith-based
organizations to undertake what could be called private spiritual and social work with
public dollars. 2 There is a canny historical logic to this. In the United States there is
a long tradition of the association of the private sphere with the feminine, with
sentiment, and with religion. I am thinking here in particular of the nineteenth century
when what has been called the culture of sentiment stretched roughly from 1830 to
1870.1 That this period saw the publication of the most famous-and
9. Kathleen Woodward, Statistical Panic, 11.2 DIFFERENCES 177 (1999).
10. See George W. Bush: The Speech; What They're Saying, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan.
21,2001, at B2; see also David Nyhan, George W. Bush's Civil Beginning, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 21, 2001, at E7.
11. See Dana Milbank & Mary Beth Sheridan, Bush-Fox Friendship Serves Both, WASH.
POST, Sept. 3, 2001, at Al; see also Salim Muwakkil, US. Remains Out of Step-Globally,
CHL. TRIB., June 11, 2001, at NI3.
12. What Lauren Berlant writes in The Queen ofAmerica Goes to Washington City about
the right-wing Reagan revolution, continued in the George Bush years, applies here: "This
brightly lit portrait of a civic army of sanctified philanthropists was meant to replace an image
of the United States as a Great Society with a state-funded social safety net." LAUREN G.
BERLANT, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO WASHINGTON CITY: ESSAYS ON SEX AND
CITIZENSHIP 7 (1997).
13. Since the publication of Ann Douglas's The Feminization ofAmerican Culture in
20021
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effective-instance of the fictional sentimental narrative would seem to be no
accident. Indeed, Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin or Life Among the
Lowly 4 is the narrative to which scholars of sentiment in literary and cultural studies
inevitably return. In the United States it is the ur-text of the liberal narrative of
compassion.
Published in 1852, Uncle Tom's Cabin was the first book in the United States to
sell over a million copies.15 Praised by literary critic Jane Tompkins in her own
influential Sensational Designs as a potent cultural force in the abolition of slavery,
Uncle Tom's Cabin has been widely credited with accomplishing important cultural
work. 6 In Uncle Tom's Cabin, the way ofjustice-I use the term with its religious
overtones advisedly-is that of compassion. The reader is prompted to identify
empathetically with a character that is suffering (generally through the medium of
another character), and this response is read as an experience in moral pedagogy. A
spontaneous burst of feeling leads to a change of heart; the emotions and morality are
linked. Consider this small scene from Uncle Tom's Cabin. In a chapter entitled "The
Little Evangelist," the tender-hearted little Eva, herself soon to die, takes pity on
Topsy, the unruly, undisciplined slave girl who does not believe in God and who is
driving everyone in the St. Clare household to distraction:
"0, Topsy, poor child, I love you!" said Eva, with a sudden burst of feeling, and
laying her little thin, white hand on Topsy's shoulder; "I love you, because you
haven't had any father, or mother, or friends;--because you've been a poor, abused
child! I love you and I want you to be good. ... "'
The tears in Eva's eyes beget tears in Topsy. Compassion inspires conversion. As
Stowe writes, "The round, keen eyes of the black child were overcast with
tears;-large, bright drops rolled heavily down, one by one, and fell on the little white
1977 and Jane Tompkins's Sensational Designs in 1985, a fierce defense of the sentimental,
the study of the sentimental in literary and cultural studies, including film studies, has
emphasized the association of the sentimental with the feminine, notwithstanding much
research that has sought to explore the intersections of the sentimental with race and ethnicity.
See ANN DOUGLAS, THE FEMNITION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1977); see also JANE P.
TOMPKINS, SENSATIONAL DESIGNS: THE CULTURAL WORK OF AMERICAN FICTION, 1790-1860
(1985). But recent scholarship has shown that the man of feeling has in fact a long history. See
SENTIMENTAL MEN: MASCULNITYAND THE POLITICS OFAFFECT IN AMERICANHISTORY, supra
note 3 (containing a collection of essays that traces the antecedents of masculine displays of
affect in various domains, including presidential politics); see also JULIE ELLISON, CATO'S
TEARS AND THE MAKING OF ANGLO-AMERICAN EMOTION 6-15 (1999) (arguing brilliantly that
we can understand in part the political attraction of today's sensitive men in terms of
eighteenth-century male icons who, it is important to stress, displayed both sensibility and
emotional reserve).
14. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN OR LIFE AMONG THE LOWLY (Ann
Douglas ed., Penguin Books 1981) (1852). ,
15. TOMPKINS, supra note 13, at 124.
16. See id. at 135.
17. STOWE, supra note 14, at 409 (emphasis in original).
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hand. Yes, in that moment, a ray of real belief, a ray of heavenly love, had penetrated
the darkness of her heathen soul!" 8 Salvation comes through love, here motherly
love. Eva touches the abused Topsy, literally and emotionally. The drama has
religious overtones, the laying on of hands has healing power. Topsy is granted faith.
She also, as we would say today, acquires self-esteem. Thus key to the liberal
narrative of compassion is a scene of personal suffering and pain. Topsy, portrayed
partially as a comic figure, is a poor slave accustomed to beingwhipped, a motherless
child. Also key to the liberal narrative of compassion is a witness-here the character
of Eva and, further, the reader. Through the medium of Eva, the reader is called on
to feel that pain, to understand her suffering, and to resolve to act like Eva and thus
comprehend the injustice that is slavery.
I.
Although they draw on texts that represent vastly different aesthetics, Lynne
Henderson, Martha Nussbaum, Elizabeth Spelman, and Lauren Berlant can be seen
as the heirs to this tradition. Their work attests to the high degree of interest in the
emotion of compassion today, although it makes its appearance under different
names--empathy, pity, compassion, sympathy. Interested in the cultural politics of
the emotions, coming from different disciplines, they variously stress the importance
and ubiquity of personal narratives of suffering in eliciting compassion. For the most
part they are not in dialogue with each other, and thus one of the purposes of this
Article is to gather them together.
Both Henderson and Nussbaum make the case for compassion, or empathy, with
conviction, if not passion, in ways that a scholar of cultural studies might well find
pre-ideological and naYve. 9 I am interested in their work, finding it preeminently
reasonable, if not critical, and promising of practical consequences. Spelman and
Berlant offer a more critical, if not severe view of the uncertain relation between
feeling and action, or the limits of what I call liberal compassion.2 When is
compassion translated into protest at injustice or transmuted into policy to alleviate
suffering? When are these virtuous feelings fleeting, mere transient simulations of a
passion for justice that by definition requires sustained commitment? In the space of
this Article I will not be able to do justice to their arguments, strong and subtle as
they are. I should note too that my primary intention is not so much to challenge their
positions-indeed, it seems to me that they are each of them quite right in many
respects-but rather to show the common ground among them even as they represent
a wide spectrum of attitudes about the limits of compassion in the body politic,
ranging from the brightly optimistic to the incisively pessimistic.
18. Id. at 409-10.
19. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Narrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy of Love, in
LovE's KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYSONPHILOSOPHYAND LrrERATURE (1990) [hereinafter Nussbaum,
Narrative Emotions]; see also Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv.
1574 (1987); Martha C. Nussbaum, Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion, 13.1 SOC. PIL
& POL'Y 27 (1996) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Compassion].
20. See BERLANT, supra note 12; see also SPELMAN, supra note 1; Lauren G. Berlant,
Poor Eliza, 70.3 AM. LITERATURE 635 (1998); Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman,
Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37 (1988).
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Lynne Henderson's purpose in her preeminently clear and wide-ranging essay
Legality and Empathy, published in 1987, is to persuade us that empathy should be
cultivated as a moral capacity on the part ofjudges.2" For Henderson, empathy is a
mode of understanding that includes both affect and cognition and "reveals moral
problems" occluded by a reductionist legal rationality.' She identifies three basic
meanings associated with empathy: feeling the emotion of another; understanding the
experience of that other person; and, perhaps most importantly for mypurposes, the
specific feeling of sympathy or compassion for a person, a feeling that "can lead to
action in order to help or alleviate the pain of another." "Empathy," she writes, "is
the foundational phenomenon for intersubjectivity, which is not absorption by the
other, but rather simply the relationship of self to other, individual to community. 24
She quotes the philosopher Bernard Williams who believes that "sympathetic
identification with others. .. [is] basic to ethical human experience."' How does this
identification take place? How is empathy fostered? In the courtroom, what elicits
empathy, Henderson believes, is a narrative that conveys the texture of emotional
experience-specifically, the experience of suffering.26 Arguing that conventional
legal discourse and the rule of law relentlessly refuse empathetic narratives," she
shows how the decisions of four important cases brought before the Supreme
2 1. Henderson, supra note 19.
22. Id. at 1576.
23. Id. at 1582.
24. Id. at 1584 (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at 1585 (quoting BERNARD WILLuAMS, ETICS AND THE LIMITS OFPMILOSOPHY 90
(1985)).
26. Id. at 1650-53.
27. Id. at 1575-76; see Minow & Spelman, supra note 20; see also TE PASSIONS OF LAW
(Susan Brandes ed., 1999) (containing various essays about the role of emotion in law). If in
1987 Lynne Henderson argued for the introduction of empathetic narratives in the courtroom,
there seems to be no need to make such an argument today. Indeed in the very first sentences
of the first paragraph of her introduction, Brandes refers to compassion three times and to
sorrow twice:
Emotion pervades the law. This isn't an entirely surprising notion. We know that
witnesses bring emotion into the courtroom, and that courtroom drama can be
powerfully evocative. We've had many opportunities recently to watch the raw
emotion of witnesses, barely suppressed by the legal filters designed to mute its
force. We've heard the heartbreaking testimony of the victims, or families of
victims, of the Oklahoma City bombing, which evoked widely shared sorrow and
compassion. Louise Woodward's trial for killing a baby in her charge raised
questions about Woodward's state of mind when baby Matthew was hurt, about
whether his mother was sufficiently devoted to him, about whether the judge was
properly detached or the prosecutor sufficiently compassionate, and about the role
of national and international emotion-in this case aroller coaster of compassion,
sadness, revulsion, and outrage at the act, the verdict, and the sentence.
Id. at 1.
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Court-Brown v. Board of Education,rs Shapiro v. Thompson, 29 Roe v. Wade,30 and
Bowers v. Hardwick3'-turned on the presence, or absence, of empathetic narratives
in oral argument and on the understanding of these narratives, or the lack of it, on the
part of the justices. She concludes:
The argumentative steps taken to convey human situations to a judge might be
described as creating affective understanding by use of a narrative that includes
emotion and description ("thick" description, if you will) of a human situation
created by, resulting from, or ignored by legal structures, and consciously placing
that narrative within a legal framework."
My principal point here is that these four cases are all characterized, albeit in
different ways, by narratives of suffering. In Brown v. Board of Education, by the
suffering of African Americans who were legally barred from attending schools with
whites. 3 In Shapiro v. Thompson, by the suffering of the poor, specifically people
who moved to anew state and, on the basis of a one-year residency requirement, were
denied welfare. 4 In Roe v. Wade, by the suffering of pregnant women who had been
denied access to abortion.3" And finally, in Bowers v. Hardwick, by gays in America
who were persecuted for their sexual practices. 6
In her analysis of Brown, for instance, Henderson concludes that it was the
evocation of African-American suffering that ultimately convinced the hearts and
minds of the majority on the Court to question the morality-and thus the
legality-of segregation.37 The word "pain" rings throughout her discussion. Brown,
she writes, "was remarkable, and it remains so, in large part because it is a human
opinion responding to the pain inflicted on outsiders by the law."38 She regards the
opinion of the Court as conveying the crucial "recognition of human experience and
pain-of feeling."'39 ThurgoodMarshall's arguments before the Court, shepoints out,
relied repeatedly on "the narrative of the painful experience of being black in
American society."'  One of the dimensions of this pain, Marshall argued, is
"humiliation," which is an "actual injury."'" In the case of Brown, Henderson
concludes that the three dimensions of empathy were present: "Feeling the distress
of the blacks, understanding the painful situation created by segregation, and
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
30.410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32. Henderson, supra note 19, at 1592 (citation omitted).
33. 347 U.S. at 494.
34. 394 U.S. at 623-26.
35. 410 U.S. at 120-22.
36.478 U.S. at 192-94.
37. Henderson, supra note 19, at 1593-609.
38. Id. at 1594.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1596.
41. ARGUMENT: THE ORALARGUMENTBEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 42 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969).
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responding to the cry of pain by action." 2 Here the triumph is that, in her words,
"legality in its many forms clashed with empathy, and empathy ultimately
transformed legality.
'43
If scenes of personal pain are key to eliciting compassion, I want to stress that
Henderson does not assume that a narrative of suffering will necessarily prompt
understanding in those on the bench. She acknowledges that people are more likely
to empathize with people who are like themselves." She understands the difficulty
imposed by different cultural contexts. 5 She is altogether aware of the power of
racism, sexism, and other forms of prejudice. Indeed, her examples also bear out the
failure of empathetic narratives as tools of persuasion because the divide or
difference between those judging and those being judged was too great to be bridged
imaginatively.4 Roe v. Wade is one ofthem. "In Brown," she asserts, "the Court saw
the pain and stigma of being black in America; in the abortion cases, the Court has
arguably failed to see the pain, despair, and stigma of women with 'unwanted'
pregnancies and 'unwanted' children."'4 Male Justices could not fully understand the
possi.le suffering caused for women by unwanted pregnancy. Bowers v. Hardwick
is another example, a case in which Henderson concludes there was a complete
absence of empathetic understanding; indeed, instead of compassion, the dominant
emotion seemed to be hate, a "perversion of empathy. '4' A man named Michael
Hardwick, through a series of coincidences, was found by a police officer engaging
in oral sex with another man in his own home."' He was arrested under the Georgia
law against sodomy and charged with a felony.5 The Court voted to uphold the
sodomy law in Georgia." Henderson suggests that in this case the very absence of
vivid empathetic narratives about the prejudice suffered by gays mayhave contributed
to the unfeeling verdict.' Thus if Henderson questions any necessary connection
between empathetic narratives-or narratives of compassion-and a compassionate
judgment formed in part by responding to such a narrative, she is nevertheless
decidedly optimistic about the possibility that such narratives might prompt action,
which in her world would mean good judgments in our legal system. 3
Here Henderson joins the philosopher Martha Nussbaum, who identifies
42. Henderson, supra note 19, at 1607.
43. Id. at 1594.
44. Id. at 1580.
45. Id.
46. See generally id. at 1620-49.
47. Id. at 1620.
48. Id. at 1638.
49. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 196.
52. Henderson, supra note 19, at 1638-49.
53. Id. at 1650. Toni M. Massaro offers a sharp rebuttal to Henderson, arguing that the
focus on empathy "represents a hope that certain specific, different and previously
disenfranchised voices-such as those of blacks and women and poor people and
homosexuals-will be heard, and willprevail." Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling,
and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MIca. L. REv. 2099, 2113 (1989)
(emphasis in original).
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compassion as the basic social emotion. 4 In an excellent essay published in 1996
under the title Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion, Nussbaum argues
persuasively that compassion is amoral sentiment characterized by a certain mode of
reason or ofjudgment 5 Thus, like Henderson, she believes that emotion in general
and compassion inparticular can have a cognitive edge. 6 Like Henderson, Nussbaum
sees compassion as an emotional bridge between the individual and the community,
as, in a formulation that I think Henderson would admire, a "bridge to justice."'
For Nussbaum, compassion is also an instance of what she has elsewhere called
the "narrative emotions," that is, emotions called up by literature, teaching us, in her
view, about suffering." It is thus by design that she opens her essay evoking the
tragic suffering of Philoctetes in Sophocles' drama of the same name." Later in her
essay she draws on what she calls the contemporary novel of realism-Richard
Wright's Native Son' is one of her examples-to think through the role of
compassion.6 She concludes her essaywith recommendations forputting compassion
to use in public life today.62 Among her suggestions is the sensible call for
multicultural education in our schools, one of the primary bases of which would be
the study of narratives of suffering.63 As she advises, "public education at every level
should cultivate the ability to imagine the experiences of others and to participate in
their sufferings.""
One of Nussbaum's purposes is to recuperate under the rubric of compassion the
original meaning of pity in the Aristotelian sense: pity entailed the spectator's sense
that he or she could suffer similar misfortune.65 This was crucial, she argues, to a
visionof socialjustice." Over time, however, pity acquired the injurious sense of the
superiority of the spectator.67 This is clearly seen in the definition of compassion
given in the Oxford English Dictionary: "The feeling or emotion, when a person is
moved by the suffering or distress of another, and by the desire to relieve it; pity that
inclines one to spare or to succor."6 Whereas compassion as "participation in
54. Compare Henderson, supra note 19, with Nussbaum, Compassion, supra note 19, and
Nussbaum, Narrative Emotions, supra note 19.
55. See Nussbaum, Compassion, supra note 19, at 37.
56. Compare id. at 3 8, with Henderson, supra note 19, at 1579. One of the major debates
in studies of the emotions is whether the emotions have an epistemological dimension and, if
so, under what conditions. In the past fifteen years in philosophy, convincing cases have been
made that the opposition between reason and emotion is specious.
57. Compare Nussbaum, Compassion, supra note 19, at 37, with Henderson, supra note
19, at 1585.
58. See generally Nussbaum, Narrative Emotions, supra note 19.
59. Nussbauna, Compassion, supra note 19, at 27.
60. RICHARD WRIGHT, NATvE SON (1940).
61. Nussbaum, Compassion, supra note 19, at 41.
62. Id. at 50-57.
63. Id. at 50-51.
64. Id. at 50.
65. Id. at 51.
66. Id. at 37.
67. Id. at35.
68. 111 OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 597 (2d ed. 1989).
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suffering; fellow-feeling, sympathy"69 is obsolete, compassion is now understood as
an emotion "shown towards a person in distress by one who is free from it, who is,
in this respect, his superior."7 In Nussbaum's view, this negative connotation of
condescension, which is implicit in the definition of pity today, works againstavision
of socialjustice.7 I agree. Nonetheless, Nussbaum does not so much concern herself
with the dangers of appropriation of feeling as with the possibility of what she calls
a "sense of commonness." 2 This is a liberal position. But she is clearly sensitive to
questions of difference. And this is also a liberal position. I quote her at some length:
Pity does indeed involve empathetic identification as one component: for in
estimating the seriousness of the suffering, it seems important, if not sufficient, to
attempt to take its measure as the person herself measures it. But even then, in the
temporary act of identification, one is always aware of one's own separateness from
the sufferer-it is for another, and not oneself, that one feels; and one is aware both
of the bad lot of the sufferer and of the fact that it is, right now, not one's own....
One must also be aware of one's own qualitative difference from the sufferer: aware,
for example, that Philoctetes has no children and no friends, as one does oneself. For
these recognitions are crucial in getting the right estimation of the meaning of the
suffering."
As with Henderson, then, Nussbaum cautions that in responding to suffering, we
must take care to take our own difference into account, to understand it.7 4 But there
is a significant difference between them. As the cases she discusses attest, Henderson
identifies, if you will, predominately with people who are suffering at the hands of
social injustice, from the cruelties of a prejudiced society."' Nussbaum, on the other
hand, writes primarily from the point of view of the person who witnesses suffering,
from the point of view of the reader or spectator, and her focus in the above passage
is telling. 6 Philoctetes is a tragic hero, a subject of tragedy. He is exemplary, not a
common man.
Finally, Nussbaum argues convincingly that one may understand a situation with
compassion even though one does not have the feeling itself.' At base she
understands compassion as "a certain sort of thought about the well-being of others,"
as "a certain sort of reasoning."' How is this possible? If one has had the experience
of the feeling of compassion, if one has learned to be sensitive to suffering and if one
feels passionately about social justice, and if this has become part and parcel of how
one evaluates situations and is moved to action, then, Nussbaum concludes, one "has
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Nussbaum, Compassion, supra note 19, at 31-38.
72. Id. at 35.
73. Id. (emphasis in original).
74. Id.
75. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 1593-650.
76. See Nussbaum, Compassion, supra note 19, at 35.
77. Id. at 37-38.
78. rd. at 28.
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pity whether he experiences this or that tug in his stomach or not." 9 "No such
particular bodily feeling is necessary," she continues." She joins Henderson here,
who emphasizes the importance not just of feeling pain but of understanding the
experience of suffering." Nussbaum makes a crucial theoretical distinction here, one
that has significant aesthetic consequences: it allows her to distance herself from the
aesthetic of the sentimental. One need not be, in Nussbaum's world, moved to tears
in order to be moved to pity, her preferred term. In fact, given her taste in narrative
(she is drawn to Beckett, not Stowe), she would no doubt agree with the poet Wallace
Stevens that "[s]entimentality is a failure of feeling."'
In her thoughtful bookFruits ofSorrow: Framing OurAttention to Suffering,83 the
philosopher Elizabeth Spelman, unlike Henderson and Nussbaum, does not so much
make the case for compassion as explore some of the complex contradictions that can
be involved in the various ways our attention is focused on suffering."' She draws on
a wide spectrum of work-from Plato and Aristotle to Jean Fagin Yellin and Bill T.
Jones. But in the context of my essay it is her discussion of Harriet Jacobs's Incidents
in the Life of a Slave Girl,8" written as a first-person narrative and published under
the pseudonym of Linda Brent in 1861, that is most relevant. For Jacobs was herself,
as Spelman shows, exquisitely attuned to the dangers as well as the promises posed
by using compassion as a political tool in calling attention to the evils of slavery.86
Spelman in effect suggests that Jacobs rewrote Uncle Tom's Cabin by adding outrage
to the emotional score of sentimentality, thereby emphasizing notjust the importance
of an individual's compassionate response to another's pain but also the importance
ofjudging the institution of slavery. In such a case, compassion, in other words, must
include the element ofrecognizing injustice, which is a political and social condition,
not only an existential one. Spelman quotes this passage from the book written by the
former slave:
Could you have seen that mother clinging to her child, when they fastened the irons
upon his wrists; could you have heard her heart-rending groans, and seen her blood-
shot eyes wander wildly from face to face, vainly pleading for mercy.... [C]ould
you have witnessed that scene as I saw it, you would exclaim, Slavery is damnable!"7
Jacobs draws on the conventions of the sentimental but she stops short, surprising
us by withholding the rhetoric of tears that is the stock in trade of sentimental
literature and inserting instead the rhetoric of outrage. A narrative scene of suffering
79. Id. at 38.
80. Id.
81. Compare id., with Henderson, supra note 19, at 1584-85.
82. WAuACESTEVENS,Adagia, in OPUs POsTHUMOUs 162 (Samuel F. Morse ed., 1957).
83. Spelman, supra note 1.
84. Compare id., with Henderson, supra note 19, at 1576-78, 1592-94, Nussbaum,
Compassion, supra note 19, at 50-58, andNussbaum, Narrative Emotions, supra note 19,294-
97.
85. HARRIET A. JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL (Signet Classic 2000)
(1861).
86. SPELMAN, supra note 1, at 59-61.
87. Id. at 78-79 (quoting JACOBS, supra note 85, at 23) (emphasis in original).
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is key. But the emotional response demanded of the reader is more complex than that
in the scene I quoted earlier from Uncle Tom's Cabin where Eva sympathizes with
Topsy as a motherless child. The tender feeling of compassion, Spelman suggests,
can be seductive, serving to seal a short circuit of feeling, confining it to the
individual. Outrage, on the other hand, is here directed at the slave owners, which is
just as it should be. Deserving of compassion, the slave is not reduced to a mere
victim but retains moral agency, issuing a judgmpent call.
Not surprisingly, Spelman shrinks from the social structure of hierarchy and
condescension implied by the contemporary understanding of pity, although she
understands that compassion and pity are often used interchangeably, unlike
Nussbaum she does not want to recuperate pity as a useful political emotion-and I
agree that there is no reason to fight what would be, I think, a vain rhetorical battle.
Yet for Spelman, as with Nussbaun, a person who experiences compassion for
another is one who in fact imagines that they too could be the subject of suffering.8
All in all Spelman strikes a wise balance between the illicit appropriation of the pain
of others and the possibilities of understanding another's pain. As she writes, "despite
the ever-present possibility of such exploitative sentimentality-and here again is the
tension, the paradox, in appropriation-it would be absurd to deny that in some
important sense people can and should try to put on the experiences of others."89 I
appreciate her common sense. At the same time, one of the continuing concerns
throughout the pages of her book is the following question, and in her hands it is both
a philosophical and a political question: when does the feeling of compassion become
an end in itself and thwart action? Ultimately for Spelman a cultural politics of
compassion is understood as one that can have valuable effects and must be judged
case by case."°
The most trenchant indictment of the contradictions implicit in the sentimental
narrative in relation to the politics of the American nation has been offered by Lauren
Berlant.9' In a brilliant essay entitled Poor Eliza,' she examines a rich archive of
88. Compare id. at 113-32, with Nussbaum, Compassion, supra note 19, at 34-36, and
Nussbaum, Narrative Emotions, supra note 19, at 309-11.
89. SPELMAN, supra note 1, at 119..
90. Id. at 82-89.
91. See Berlant, supra note 20. The scholarship in literary and cultural studies on
sentimentality in American culture is vast. See, e.g., SENTIMENTAL MEN: MASCULINITY AND
THEPOLITICS OFAFFECT IN AMERICANHISTORY, supra note 3 (providing a concise introduction
of the topic). I single out two here-ELIZAETH BARNES, STATES OF SYMPATHY: SEDUCTION
AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAN NOVEL (1997), and THE CULTURE OF SENTIMENT: RACE,
GENDER, AND SENTIMENTALITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Shirley Samuels ed.,
1992). Generally speaking, studies of the sentimental and studies of trauma are not in dialogue
with one another. Perhaps this is because, as Philip Fisher has pointed out, "one of the key
sentimental assumptions [is] that suffering does not brutalize, nor does it silence its victims or
lead them to save themselves by repressing what they have undergone." Philip Fisher,
Democratic Social Space. Whitman, Melville and the Promise ofAmerican Transparency, in
THE NEW AMERICAN STUDIES 100 (Philip Fisher ed., 1991). Trauma, on the other hand, is
conceived of precisely as a pathology. As Cathy Caruth defines it, trauma exists "solely in the
structure ofthe experience or reception: the event is not assimilated or experienced fully at the
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texts that draw on the strategies and tropes of Uncle Tom's Cabin, the ur-text of the
American liberal narrative of compassion. Indeed her title refers to Uncle Tom's
Cabin through the textual relay-or what Berlant wonderfully calls an "emotional
quotation or affective citation"93 -of Rogers and Hammerstein's 1949 musical The
King and I,9 which contains a memorable scene where a female slave in the King's
palace in Siam herself stages a scene from Uncle Tom's Cabin where the slave Eliza
runs for her life.95 In a complex reading of the musical, she acknowledges the salutary
aspects associated with the evocation of Stowe's novel, among them the impetus of
a nation to be socially progressive at a critical historical juncture.96 But ultimately the
scaffold of the sentimental, Berlant insists, collapses under the untenable weight of
its contradictions:
[W]hen sentimentality meets politics, it uses personal stories to tell of structural
effects, but in so doing it risks thwarting its very attempt to perform rhetorically a
scene of pain that must be soothed politically. Because the ideology of true feeling
cannot admit the nonuniversality of pain, its cases become all jumbled together and
the ethical imperative toward social transformation is replaced by a civic-minded but
passive ideal of empathy. The political as a place of acts oriented toward publicness
becomes replaced by a world of private thoughts, leanings, and gestures."
The sentimental framing of suffering, Berlant insists, is corrupt for many reasons,
not least of which is that the sentimental narrative relies on scenes of pain that
wrongly presume that such suffering is universal.9" For the pain of slavery cannot be
understood fully, or assumed, by a white middle-class reader, the politics of personal
feeling cannot address the institutional (or what Berlant calls the structural) reasons
for injustice. 9 The narrative affords the pleasure of consuming the feeling of
vicarious suffering-and its putative moral precipitate, the feeling of self-satisfaction
that we wish to do the right thing and thus are virtuous. " But the experience of being
moved by these sentimental scenes of suffering, whose ostensible purpose is to
awaken us to redress injustice, works instead to return us to a private world far
time, but only belatedly in its repeated possession of the one who experiences it."oTRAUMA:
EXPLORATIONS IN MEMORY 4 (Cathy Caruth ed., 1995) (emphasis in original). Berlant,
however, makes an astute point about the similar grounds shared by the sentimental and
traumatic narrative. "Currently," she writes, "as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity
of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared"--she is referring to, among
other things, narratives of the Holocaust---"is disseminated as a prophylactic against the
reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violenice." Berlant, supra note 20, at 657.
92. Berlant, supra note 20.
93. Id. at 647.
94. RicHARD ROGERS & OscAR HAMMERSTEIN II, The King and I, in Six PLAYS BY
ROGERS AND HAMMERSTEIN (1959).
95. Id. act 2, sc. 3, at 422-29.
96. Berlant, supra note 20, at 638.
97. Id. at 641.
98.Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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removed from the public sphere."0 ' Thus in a crippling contradiction, Berlant
concludes, the result of such empathetic identification is not the impulse to action but
rather a "passive" posture." Fundamentally, therefore, the sentimental narrative is
deliciously consumable and cruelly ineffective. Berlant's critique of the sentimental
narrative, or sentimental liberalism, is severe, even unforgiving. The genre of the
sentimental narrative itself is morally bankrupt."
But inPoorEliza, Berlant identifies as well what she calls the postsentimental text,
offering James Baldwin's essay on Uncle Tom's Cabin entitled Everyone's Protest
Novel,"°4 Robert Waller's The Bridges of Madison County, °5 and Toni Morrison's
Beloved"° as templates. 7 What differentiates these texts from sentimental texts?
Among other things, a clear-eyed if nonetheless ambivalent refusal of the fantastical
optimism central to the sentimental narrative. More specifically, with Everyone's
Protest Novel, the "powerful language of rageful truth-telling."'01 Like Harriet
Jacobs, Baldwin adds outrage to the sentimental score, in effect understanding such
a complex response to suffering as necessarily having a cognitive component. In Poor
Eliza Berlant's purpose is not only to critique the sentimental liberalism she abhors
but also to explore the possibilities of a sentimental radicalism. Her own essay,
concluding with an eloquent discussion of Beloved, rises itself to the condition of
possibility beyond cynical reason and an empty, commodified optimism based on
falsely shared suffering.
The kinds of texts-literary, philosophical, cultural-that Henderson, Nussbaum,
Spelman, and Berlant take up as paradigmatic are assuredly different and thus their
positions must necessarily be different as well. Henderson focuses on oral argument
in the Supreme Court fromthe 1950s to the 1980s. " Nussbaum, notwithstanding her
references to contemporary multicultural texts, on Greek tragedy." Spelman and
Berlant, on nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature and art that protest social
injustice and are decidedly more ambivalent about the possibilities for social redress
than is the optimistic sentimental narrative."' In Nussbaum's world of liberal
compassion, for example, we are far from Berlant's unrelenting critique of the
aesthetic ideology of the sentimental. Nonetheless, all four emphasize scenes of
suffering and ofpain as basic to what I am calling the liberal narrative of compassion.
All four as well are concerned, albeit to different degrees, with the potential
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. How would Berlant respond, I wonder, to Jane Tompkins's claim that Uncle Tom's
Cabin was in great part responsible for the abolition of slavery? TOMPKINS, supra note 13, at
141.
104. JAMES BALDWIN, Everybody's Protest Novel, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET:
COLLECTED NONFICTIoN, 1948-1985, at 27 (1985).
105. ROBERT J. WALLER, THE BRIDGES OF MADISON COUNTY (1992).
106. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED (1987).
107. Berlant, supra note 20, at 637.
108. Id. at 656.
109. Henderson, supra note 19.
110. Nussbaum, Compassion, supra note 19; Nussbaum, Narrative Emotions, supra note
19.
111. SPELMAN, supra note 1; Berlant, supra note 20.
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corrupting relation of unequal power between the one who suffers and the one who
witnesses that suffering, as well as with the related question of the ineffectiveness or
effectiveness of the moral response evoked-whether empathy, pity, compassion, or
sympathy--in achieving socialjustice."2 Finally, all invest an appropriate emotional
moral response, whatever it is called, with a cognitive component, arguing that a
critical understanding of social injustice is crucial.
II.
.If sophisticated attention is being given today in the academy to the cultural
politics of compassion with serious concerns about its efficacy, the rhetoric of
compassion, appropriated by George W. Bush, had a resounding success in the last
presidential election. What calculus is involved in a conservatism that is labeled
compassionate? What characterizes a conservative narrative of compassion?
In the liberal narrative of compassion, the word "compassion" is used primarily as
a noun or a predicate adjective in relation to people. A person feels compassion or is
compassionate. Compassion is a feeling, and it is embodied. In the conservative
narrative, in contrast, compassion is used predominantly as an adjective, one that
characterizes an ideological stance, policy, or program. Bush not only ran on a
platform of compassionate conservatism, he has described his budget as
compassionate. Detached from people, compassion is attached to policies and
practices. Oddly, in the mouths of conservatives, the adjective "compassionate"
seems to have no referent to a feeling at all---or at least not to the feeling of sympathy
that is associated with compassion. It is merely a word that refers, through a sleight
of rhetoric, to economic conservatism. Here is, I believe, an instance of the waning
of affect that pervades postmodem culture. Furthermore, even if sentiment, or
sensitivity, is performed, it does not seem linked to sympathy for others. Consider,
for example, the way in which Bush seemed moved during the delivery of his
inaugural speech, affected by the rhetoric of his vision for the America. At the same
time a politics of gender is also at work. If compassion does not entail sympathy, it
clearly does refer to a strict and stem paternalism, to the demand for discipline and
responsibility. Under the screen of the feminine, compassion is masculinized in
conventional tones. On July 22, 1999, in Indianapolis, for instance, in what is
regarded as his first major policy address as a presidential candidate, Bush pledged
to "rally the armies of compassion in our communities to fight a very different war
112. I have focused on texts by four women. I do not mean to imply, however, that men
have not contributed to the exploration of the power of the narrative of social suffering in
moving people to social justice. Consider, for example, Richard Rorty, Human Rights,
Rationality, and Sentimentality, 81.4 YALE REV. 1 (1993). His position is unequivocal. "We
are now," he writes, "in a good position to put aside the last vestiges of the idea that human
beings are distinguished bythe capacityto knowratherthan bythe capacities forfriendship and
intermarriage, distinguished by rigorous rationality rather than by flexible sentimentality." 1d.
at 19. How do we convince someone to do the right thing for another person? The best way,
he counsels, is to give a sort of long, sad, sentimental story that begins "Because this is what
it is like to be in her situation-to be far from home, among strangers," or "Because she might
become your daughter-in-law," or "Because her mother would grieve for her." Id.
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against poverty" and praised programs that practice "severe mercy."' 1 How far we
are from the teary sentimental rhetoric of Uncle Tom's Cabin, from Thurgood
Marshall's passionate arguments in. Brown v. Board of Education, from Harriet
Jacobs's outrage, from Richard Wright's harrowing Native Son, and from Toni
Morrison's Beloved.
What kinds of stories do compassionate conservatives tell? In our televisual
political culture, a narrative of compassion is condensed into a visual sound bite.
Thus if Bill Clinton, in his January 20, 1999, State of the Union address, introduced
Rosa Parks, calling up decades of struggle over civil rights and evoking her suffering
as a profile in courage," 4 to whom did George W. Bush gesture in his February 27,
2001, speech to Congress outlining his budget proposal? Appropriating the
Democratic strategy of referring to people in the audience, Bush first pointed to John,
Street, Democratic mayor of Philadelphia, who has supported faith-based
organizations in Philadelphia.'" Second, to Steven and Josefina Ramos:
With us tonight, representing many American families, are Steven and Josefina
Ramos. They are from Pennsylvania, but they could be from any one of your
districts. Steven is a network administrator for a school district, Josefina is a Spanish
teacher at a charter school, and they have a 2-year old daughter. Steven and Josefina
tell me they pay almost $8,000 a year in federal income taxes; my plan will save
them more than $2,000. Let me tell you what Steven says: "Two thousand dollars a
year means a lot to my family. If we had this money it would help us reach our goal
of paying off our personal debt in two years time."" 6
Compassion is here referred to only through the implied relay to economic
conservatism, which is in fact what compassionate conservatism is. Here is the
calculus of compassionate conservatism laidbare. Note also that the members of this
small nuclear family are none of them suffering in the ways underlined in the cases
brought before the Supreme Court that Henderson discusses. The feeling of
compassion is not evoked. We are not told a story, which implies a past. Indeed there
is no real story here. We are presented instead with the possibility of a bright
economic future and the principle that people are to be rewarded for identifying goals
and working hard to achieve them. Note also that there is only a gesture to
difference-Steven and Josefina Ramos are presumably Hispanic-but the possible
harsh realities of prejudice based on difference are not invoked. Instead these three
people represent "many American families." Here we have a condensed version of
the American Dream. As Lauren Berlant writes in The Queen of America Goes to
Washington City,"' the American Dream
fuses private fortune with that of the nation: it promises that if you invest your
113. George W. Bush, The Duty of Hope, in OLASKY, supra note 5, at 219.
114. President William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address, in 145 CONG. REC. S330,
S334 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999).
115. Transcript ofPresident Bush's Message to Congress on His Budget Proposal, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at A14.
116. Id.
117. BERLANT, supra note 12.
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energies in work and in family-making, the nation will secure the broader social and
economic conditions in which your labor can gain value and your life can be lived
with dignity. It is a story that addresses the fear of being stuck or reduced to a type,
a redemptive story pinning its hope on class mobility."'
What is the model for this condensed narrative of conservative compassion?
Marvin Olasky's Compassionate Conservatism, published in 2000 and graced with
a foreword by then Governor George W. Bush, provides a template." 9 A professor
ofjournalismat the University of Texas at Austin and a born-again Christian, Marvin
Olasky has been credited with the formulation of "compassionate conservatism,"
although ironically, as he himselfpoints out, it appears that the phrase itself was first
used by none other than Bill Clinton's good friend Vernon Jordan in 1981."'
Compassionate Conservatism is the triumphant sequel to Olasky's The Tragedy of
American Compassion," a book published eight years earlier, which traces the
policies of compassionate conservatism to their roots in colonial America. If Uncle
Tom's Cabin provides the reader with a sentimental education, enacting a moral
pedagogy of the emotions, Compassionate Conservatism is a narrative of the political
education of the younger generation, rehearsing the political-and
spiritual-pedagogy ofentrepreneurship, faith, and tough love. If Uncle Tom's Cabin
and Incidents in the Life ofa Slavegirl foreground scenes of feeling that are coded as
feminine, Olasky's narrative is gendered male. The father of four sons, Olasky
recounts the journey he took in 1999 with his fourteen-year-old son Daniel to visit
programs around the United States that embody the tenets of compassionate
conservatism." Apolitical travelogue of discovery, a field trip about government for
a high school student, the narrative is, like Uncle Tom's Cabin, one of
transformation.' Transformation, however, is not a matter of enlightenment about
the suffering of other people. Rather it is about what works. Olasky writes,
The travel had changed Daniel in several vital ways, but had also changed me. I
became convinced that the bestwayto understand compassionate conservatism is not
to go through a list of theoretical statements but to walk the streets of our large cities
and talk with those whose faith is so strong that they refuse to give up.'24
In the course ofthe narrative, father and son, who live in Austin, travel to Houston
and Dallas, Indianapolis and Camden, Philadelphia and Minneapolis, St. Louis and
Washington, D.C."Z Consider Olasky's account of their visit to Indianapolis, the city
where George W. Bush delivered his first major speech as a presidential candidate
in July 1999. Olasky begins his chapter on Indianapolis by briefly sketching its
118. Id. at 4.
119. OLASKY, supra note 5.
120. Id. at 9.
121. MARViN N. OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OFAMERICAN COMPASSION (1992).
122. OLASKY, supra note 5, at 21-22.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 22.
125. Id. at 21 ("Daniel and I hit the road, on our way to visiting antipoverty programs in
Texas, the Midwest, and the East.")
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business history and then taking us to the twenty-fifth floor office of the mayor, Steve
Goldsmith, who we are told established the Front Porch Alliance, which throughout
the 1990s brought together "faith-based and other civic organizations to develop eight
hundred partnerships for neighborhood action."' From the height of government we
descend into the streets of Indianapolis and are introduced to one person after
another, all ofwhomhave successfully developed a program or a center with support
from city government, and virtually all of whom have a strong belief in
Christianity.27 They are described. They are given names. The Reverend Jay Height,
executive director ofthe Shepherd Community Center. 2s Olgen Williams, apart-time
pastor and "the long-married father often children" who was forced to quit his job
as an oil refinery foreman when he fell and broke both wrists and now manages
Christamore House, which provides food to the poor; in return for food, we are told,
Williams insists on work.29 Sixty-eight-year-old Ermil Thompson, a believer in
Christ "who worked her fingers to the bone for several years cooking and selling
lunches to raise thousands of dollars to buy and convert a dilapidated house" into
what became the Lifeline Community Center.'30 And many others.
Who are the people for whom these programs are designed? They are identified
only as drug dealers, killers, prostitutes, and gang members.' If Olasky tells about
the people who have established these programs, we do not hear the stories of people
who have been helped by them. Not one such person is individualized or given the
dignity of a name.'32 It is clear that the reader's admiration is to be directed toward
the organizers of these faith-based programs. They are the ones who have triumphed
over the odds. If we are indeed to have sympathy for anyone, it is elicited primarily
for them, a sympathy that is rapidly converted into respect for their achievement.
Take Tim Streett, a minister who when he was fifteen witnessed his father's murder
in a mugging by two inner city young men and who now, at the age of thirty-six,
married with a child of his own, has established an after-school sports program for
inner city youth.' Even the evocation of abused children does not work so much to
solicit our compassion for themas to engender our dismay at theirparents. As we saw
with Uncle Tom 's Cabin, the suffering child is the stock in trade of sentimental
literature. But here the focus is not so much on the child as it is on the parent as
victimizer. Olasky quotes Judge James Payne, who has allowed faith-based
organizations to work with the juvenile court system in Indianapolis: "'We see fetal
alcohol use, mothers on drugs physically and emotionally aggressive with
children. ' 113
Overall the emphasis is on action, on getting things done, on what has been called
effective compassion, with the stress on results and not on sentiment. The narrative
is entrepreneurial, with tough love one of its major lessons. For example, one of the
126. Id. at 62.
127. Id. at 65-87.
128. Id. at 65.
129. Id. at 73.
130. Id. at 76.
131. See id. at 65-87.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 83-87.
134. Id. at 81.
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operating principles of Teen Challenge, a national program for drug treatment, is, as
one of the members of its administration puts it: "We have a rule: If you don't work,
you don't eat."' 35 As Bush commented approvingly in his July 1999 speech, "This is
demanding love-at times, a severe mercy."""
This pragmatic stress on what works is also seen clearly in Joseph Jacobs's The
Compassionate Conservative,3 ' a book published in 2000 and blurbed
enthusiastically by then Governor Bush on its red-white-and-blue cover.' "Great
Phrase! Great ideas!" In The Compassionate Conservative, Jacobs, a former
businessman and now a philanthropist, adopts the American form of the jeremiad and
lays out what he sees as the principles of compassionate conservatism. At its core is
economic conservatism. As he writes,
compassion is an overarching moral value fundamental to all of us, no matter what
our stand on specific moral issues. Wresting exclusive ownership of it from the
liberal left will be easy if we say what conservative compassion will do. Elevating
the debate to differences in how we make compassion work will attract the economic
conservatives in America to our cause. 39
Pointing to some of the very problems identified by the scholars of sentiment I
discussed in the previous section, Jacobs asserts that liberal compassion has failed,
but that conservative compassion will work." His attention is not focused on the
suffering body. Rather his concern is that liberalism creates dependency-emotional
and economic dependency.' He perceptively observes that the pleasures of
compassion, identified by Spelman and Berlant 42 can create a"double dependency":
those who find themselves uplifted by the feeling of compassion must maintain a
constituency of people who require their compassion, a phenomenon he vividly calls
"moral greed."'4 Compassion is corrupting. Itis an "emotional narcotic," a byproduct
of which is the toxic "feeling of superior moral strength."'" But if in all of the texts
I have chosen to discuss-from Stowe to Berlant-there has been sustained interest
in the suffering of African-Americans in particular in the United States, in The
Compassionate Conservative we find instead the rhetorical transformation of the fact
of this history of slavery and suffering into a brutal metaphor for dependency across
the entire population of America that Jacobs believes is the responsibility of
liberals."45 "The welfare state created by liberals in pursuit of their compassion has
assumed the role of the benevolent slave owner of the twentieth century," he
proclaims, crudely drawing on America's history of slavery to delegitimize
135. Id. at 219.
136. Id.
137. JACOBS, supra note 6.
138. Id.
139. Id. at xxii.
140. See id. at xix-xxiv.
141. Id. at xxiii.
142. See SPELMAN, supra note 1; Berlant, supra note 20.
143. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 41.
144. Id. at 84.
145. Id. at xxiv.
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Democratic policies." What does Jacobs propose? His interest is not in faith-based
charities-even if animated by tough love-but in the creation of jobs. For him the
creation of jobs is itself an act of compassion.'47 What kinds of stories does he tell
about compassion? Business stories. Early in his book he tells us about the difficult
times he himself endured in 1984 when, as the head of his company, he was forced
to restructure his workforce, including "reducing permanent staff by almost half.' 48
"The emotional toll on those of us who had to do this restructuring was debilitating,"
he writes.
49
We spent many sleepless nights as our compassion for those people who were being
fired (I refuse to use softer words) was constantly being challenged by our
compassion for the rest of the people who would lose theirjobs if the company were
allowed to fail. This is one more illustration that compassion is not an unalloyed
virtue. Even with that noble virtue one needs to make choices-tough choices....
It need hardly to be noted that the focus is first directed to his wretched feelings,
not those of the soon to be unemployed. But how, given the importance of the
creatiori ofjobs, does this narrative that begins with unemployment come to an end?
On a note of enterprising optimism. In the business world, which Jacobs regards as
a microcosm of America, his firing of people proved successful: some fifteen years
later the company is four times larger, the result of tough love, among other factors.'5'
Thus calculation ofcompassion is atbase quantitative, economic. As Jacobs recounts
later in The Compassionate Conservative, telling another business story of
compassionate conservatism, writing of the successful measures he put in place to
reduce the number of injuries in his company, there was also an economic benefit, a
brightening of the bottom line." The conclusion of this narrative? "Our insurance
premiums are reduced," he notes." "Therefore, self-interest is served."'"
The liberal narrative of compassion asks us-to have sympathy for those who are
suffering unjustly; such suffering is understood as social suffering. 55 George W.
Bush, in appropriating the rhetoric of compassion and drawing on the above two
models of compassionate conservatism, has shrewdly excised the suffering
body-one characterized by difference-from his national narrative of the future of
the United States. Foregrounded are not the suffering bodies of African-Americans
and the poor, but ministers and businessmen. With Bush's plan for faith-based
charities, calling on ministers who provide spiritual healing, we find ourselves in an
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148. Id. at 28.
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152. Id. at 153-54.
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uncanny return to the nineteenth century. Compassion is not only given a religious
dimension, it is masculinized. With Bush's belief in economic conservatism, we
return to the Reagan Years under the banner of compassion. Yet Bush does not ask
us to focus on people in pain. He does not concern himself with the problem of the
appropriation of feeling or of an unequal balance of power. If Nussbaum asks us to
resurrect the emotion of pity in social and political life today, placing pity in an
historical narrative and contending that we must recuperate its former sense of
"fellow-feeling, sympathy,"'" Marvin Olasky does not go to so much trouble: he
simplyinsists on the obsolete definition ofcompassion"j given inthe Oxford English
Dictionary as: "Suffering together with another, participation in suffering; fellow-
feeling, sympathy." 'IS Compassion is, he declares in Compassionate Conservatism,
"suffering with."'5 In a politicalybrilliant move, by the sleight of hand of definition,
the problem of an imbalance of power is eliminated. Thus in the conservative
narrative of compassion-indeed in a sense there is no narrative, merely citations,
and thus virtually no emotion can be enkindled-the critique of the liberal narrative
of compassion is converted into a strength for conservatives. If the liberal focus is on
the uncertain connection between feeling and action, the calculated response of
conservatives has been to incisively sever the link between feelings of compassion
for people and action, eliminating the feeling of compassion altogether.
II.
But I would be remiss if I concluded on the above note. As I did research for this
Article I was surprised by the ways in which I felt drawn to several of the pragmatic
arguments advanced by conservatives and by the unexpected directions in which my
reading took me. Jacobs ends his book not with his own words but with a confession
on the part of two self-identified compassionate hberals-Jennifer Vanica and Ron
Cummings." They have worked for five years as directors of the Jacobs Family
Foundation and the Jacobs Center for Nonprofit Innovation and refer to themselves
as having been converted by the experience. 6' Having spent twenty years in the
nonprofit world, they were more than skeptical of Jacobs's free market strategies,
including the tenet of accountability. 62 But after some five years with the Family
Foundation, they realized that grants that do not lead to self-sustainability simply do
not work and pursued a bolder strategy of what they call "venture" philanthropy with
the Jacobs Center forNonProfit Innovation.'63 And theyhave seen successes. ' They
thus refer to his story of the 1984 restructuring of his company with respect, not
cynicism.'65 "Dr. Jacobs tells the story of coming out of retirement when Jacobs
156. Nussbaum, Compassion, supra note 19, at 29-31.
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165. Id. at 267.
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Engineering was floundering and having to fire middle management and restructure
the company," they write." "He says it was the most painful experience of his
professional life. 67 But it saved the company and resurrected it to employ many more
people.""' Their testimony I found sobering. As well, the idea that some action after
all might work I found immensely hopeful. What was stirred in me was not
compassion but hope, the feeling that something could be done. Perhaps I was only
responding to being interpellated as a caring citizen, seduced by an empty promise.
Certainly the workings of the Bush administration have not given me reason to
increase my expectations. ButI did find myselfop en to entertaining new possibilities,
attracted to the meditations on compassion by the philosopher Simone Well in great
part because she asks us-in an unsentimental way-to take on the responsibility of
doing good works. 69 For her-although I simplify here-justice is a form of
compassion, and justice is a social act. 7' For her compassion is not so much a
sentiment as it is a belief.'' I also turned to the challenging work of the German
philosopher Agnes Heller who argues that conscience is an emotion, an idea that is
intriguingbecause she reverses the conventional understanding that feelings of caring
are ethical, suggesting instead that an ethical sense is itselfa feeling." Heller prefers
to use the word "concern" to describe this moral orientation to the world.77 For
Heller concern includes helping those in need.74 Here she recalls Lynne Henderson's
inclusion of the desire to alleviate the suffering of others in the meanings of empathy,
but Heller's emphasis falls less on feeling and more on involvement. "Decent persons
indeed feel empathy," she writes. 75 "[However their predominant emotional state of
mind is one of concern rather than one of compassion (though it does not exclude the
feeling of compassion).... Being concerned includes the readiness 'to do something
about it." 7 6
The legal scholar Martha Minow has recently spoken about the blurring of
boundaries between the public and the private, the secular and the religious, and the
nonprofit and profit worlds, closing her lecture with an invitation to join her in a
"search for ways to turn rivals into partners in the service of fairness, skill, and
compassion."'" She suggests that we need new metaphors to help us build this world
together-not the language ofboundaries and lines but of commitments and values. 78
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I would further suggest that the boundaries are blurring, appropriatelyso, between the
emotions and judgment or reason, and that we need to find a way to avoid accenting
one term over the other. The philosopher Annette Baier offers us one way: she
theorizes trust as a value that mediates between what she sees in contemporary
philosophical debates as a feminist emphasis on caring and compassion and a male
emphasis on law, obligation, and contract, both of them ultimately inadequate
positions formanyreasons-for what we might call humane reasons without blushing
or wincing. 79 I like her singling out trust as a value. Trust does not belong to what
Berlant would call a passive world of feeling, one that can be satisfied with the
narcotic of feeling itself. Trust is a declaration of respect, an appraisal of the
world-in the form of another person or an institution, for example-and is thus a
judgment. Trust therefore has a cognitive dimension. It belongs not just to a world of
solipsistic self-regarding feeling, which is, as we have learned, one of the dangers of
compassion. Trust assumes a world of interdependency. Trust confers agency on
others. Trust can itself be a gift, in the hope that it is offered wisely.
179. ANNETrE C. BAlER, MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETMICS (1994).
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